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A huge Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak has been striking
West Africa since December 2013. Virological investigation
identiﬁed Ebola virus (EBOV; formely Zaire ebolavirus) as
the causative agent; this is one of the ﬁve species of the
genus Ebolavirus, which was also involved in the outbreaks in
Central Africa from 1976 [1,2]. EBOV is characterized by an
80% fatality rate in humans, and is also responsible for the
catastrophic decline in wild great ape populations in Central
Africa [3,4]. The current EVD outbreak started in Conakry
Guinea, and spread into Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and
ﬁnally Senegal, where one case has just been reported.
Although this outbreak continues to expand, with more and
more victims, on 7 September 2014 the WHO reported
4366 conﬁrmed cases, including 2218 deaths, representing
more than double the number of cases listed overall since
1976. To date, the reported numbers are as follows: in
Conakry Guinea, 861 cases, including 557 deaths; in Liberia,
2081 cases, including 1137 deaths; in Sierra Leone, 1287
cases, including 478 deaths; and ﬁnally, in Nigeria, 21 cases,
including eight deaths. The only case reported in Senegal
appeared to be a patient who had escaped from Con-
akry Guinea. Meanwhile, in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), a new outbreak, suspected to have
emerged from an animal source, was conﬁrmed on 26
August 2014.
The EVD crisis was minimized and underestimated for
>30 years, mainly because the impact of EVD on public
health was judged to be ‘ridiculous’ as compared with other
infectious diseases such as AIDS, malaria, and Dengue. It was
described as a ‘little disease of poor countries’, but the
terrifying ongoing EVD outbreak in West Africa will
certainly change the usual scientiﬁc, sanitary and political
approaches.
Towards research guided by a public health
approach
The impressive numbers of EVD cases and deaths, which are
far from complete, led the WHO to proclaim this EVD
outbreak in West Africa as a ‘public health worldwide
emergency with international impact and considerable sanitary
risk for all other countries’. The new dimensions reached by
EBOV will not only increase and diversify research teams, but
will also result in more studies on treatment and the
development of a vaccine, which currently does not exist.
The actual public health dimension will become more impor-
tant than the simple commercial considerations that have
predominated so far. This will ﬁnally convince government and
pharmaceutical ﬁrms to invest in the large-scale production of
treatment agents and vaccines, even if these are not yet
authorized [5,6].
Towards a diversiﬁcation of diagnostic
capabilities
The increase in the number of EBOV cases has resulted in a
huge increase in the number of contacts, and thus an increase
in the number of suspected cases. Although some clinical signs
are easily identiﬁable and relatively speciﬁc, EVD can be
confused with many other diseases. Indeed, fever, vomiting,
diarrhoea and cutaneous rash are the symptoms that most
frequently develop. In this context, laboratory diagnosis is
essential. Despite hopes for future treatment agents and
vaccines, reducing human-to-human transmission will always
remain key in the ﬁght against EVD outbreaks: isolation of
suspected cases and medical care provided by completely
protected competent staff; protected burial of dead EVD
victims; and education of populations about routes of trans-
mission and risk factors of EVD. To manage the multiplication
of suspected cases, mainly resulting from the real increase in
the number of contaminated people, but also from the
imprecision in inclusion protocols for suspected cases, a
decrease in the security level of laboratories authorized to
manipulate such biohazardous material for diagnostic purposes
is necessary, ethically justiﬁed, and even is required from the
point of view of public health ethics. Achieving a diagnosis by
real-time PCR methods in laboratories that are technically
equipped, experienced in virological diagnosis and with a
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class 3 security level will considerably decrease the associated
costs, and will shorten the diagnostic delay, which is a crucial
parameter in the ﬁght against EVD outbreaks.
Towards an unavoidable evolution of EBOVs
EVD is a zoonosis that is accidentally transmitted to humans.
The transmission can occur directly from natural hosts of
EBOV [7], or indirectly from intermediate animal species such
as gorillas and chimpanzees [3]. In its own reservoir, EBOV
replicates very slowly in target organs such as the liver and
spleen; viral load is often undetectable, and the animal does
not usually show any symptoms. The genomic evolution of
EBOV is therefore very slow. In humans, the situation is
completely reversed. Indeed, EBOV ﬁnds a favourable envi-
ronment for replication, and can reach extremely high viral
loads (up to 109 particles/mL of blood). The high viral
multiplication rate increases the probability of mutation.
However, genomic studies performed on viruses isolated
during outbreaks from 1976 to 2008 showed very low genetic
diversity (approximately 3%) [8]. This relative genomic stability
of EBOV can probably be explained by the small scale of these
outbreaks to date. However, the exceptionally large-scale
current outbreak could change this situation, and dramatically
speed up the genomic evolution of EBOV [9]. The exponential
increase in the number of detected cases, and thus of
human-to-human transmission events, will increase the muta-
tion rate of EBOV. All of these factors could ﬁnally induce
phenotypic modiﬁcations in virulence or transmission mode in
humans; airborne or vector-borne transmission could have
catastrophic effects.
Towards an ecological continental approach
Although exceptional because of its large scale and its
geographical expansion, the EDV outbreak in West Africa is
not surprising. Indeed, the distribution of EBOV reservoir
species (Hypsignathus monstrosus, Epomops franqueti, Myonyc-
teris torquata, and probably Rousettus aegyptiacus) extends
across all African forested regions, from the south of Senegal
to the north of South Africa and the east of the DRC,
including all countries along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean
[10]. Under favourable conditions, the spill-over of EBOV
from its natural host is likely to occur anywhere in all of these
regions. In general, human contamination occurs during
handling and butchering of these animals, which are widely
consumed by local populations [7]. Today, the factors
controlling this spill-over are not all known, but they can be
divided into three categories: (i) social and behavioural factors
that lead to exposure to viral agents; (ii) virological factors
intrinsic to infected animals that affect viral load; (iii) and
virological factors associated with the reservoir population,
affecting the proportion of infected animals. Whereas the
causes of variability in factors in the two ﬁrst categories are
partially known (e.g. an increase in the amount of consump-
tion of bats because of the scarcity of other animals, or
increases in viral load in breeding females, immunodepressed
animals, or co-infected animals), there is still much to discover
about the third category. The global pattern of EVD outbreaks
seems to indicate that, at a continental scale, they have a
cyclical nature, with low and high phases. This could suggest a
periodic signiﬁcant increase in infected animal rates in the
continent overall that would result in higher rates of
transmission to human populations. In fact, two outbreaks
appeared at the same time in two distinct regions in 1976 (the
DRC and Sudan); similarly, ﬁve outbreaks occurred in 1995–
1996 in three different countries (Ivory Coast, the DRC, and
Gabon); and there were numerous independent epidemic
chains during the 2001–2002 outbreak in Gabon and Brazza
Congo, and again in 2003 in Brazza Congo. Today, the
occurrence of at least two EVD outbreaks in distant countries
(Conakry Guinea and the DRC) tends to support this idea.
Conﬁrmation of this potential phenomenon and understanding
the factors leading to the increase in the global infection rates
in bat populations could be valuable for evaluating the risk of
viral emergence and predicting EBOV outbreaks. Determina-
tion of an alert threshold will be crucial in the ﬁght against
EVD outbreaks, where rapidity and efﬁciency of action are
fundamental.
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